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Ever since the end of the Second World War, Rational Actor models have 
dominated strategic thinking at all levels of government policy and military 
planning. In the confrontation between states, and especially during the Cold 
War, these models were insightful and useful in anticipating a wide array of 
challenges and in stabilizing the world peace enough to prevent nuclear war. 
But now our society faces a whole new range of challenges from non-state 
actors who are committed to die in order to kill and terrorize enough of our 
citizens to change the course of history. The darkest fear in the current 
struggle with terrorism is a nuclear bomb exploding in a major city.  
Given the operational demise of Al Qaeda and the still generally amateurish 
capabilities of its spiritual descendents, the present probability of such an 
event is low. Nevertheless, low probability events do occur and they are 
responsible for most of the cataclysmic and cascading changes that move 
human history from one phase to the next. Yet even attacks on the scale of 
September 11th, such as the recently foiled plane bombing plot out of 
London, with several thousand casualties and tens of billions of dollars in 
losses, can cause great and unpredictable changes, just as September 11 
set the stage for the Iraq War and its spiraling aftermath.  
The ability of a few deeply committed terrorists to change the world is a 
strategic challenge that standard, rational state actor models do not 
adequately address. We need new ways of thinking about the Devoted Actor 
who is routinely willing to make extreme sacrifices that are all out of 
proportion to the likely prospects of success. That's what my research tries 
do.   
But even if it were the best and truest research, rather than only the 
preliminary and tentative research it is, it could have little present effect. 
That's because policy is a product of the way government is structured. If 
policy making bodies don't have people who are as familiar with new ways of 
thinking as with old, nothing new can be done. And that's why I sincerely 
appreciate the opportunity to directly address policymakers — not to tell 
policymakers what they should do (they, and not researchers like me, are 
elected by the people or appointed by elected officials to make policy), but to 
inform about what is newly possible and plausible within the moral limits I 
have chosen. 
Increasingly across the world, political conflict is a moral clash between 
different sets of sacred values, which communities, cultures or civilizations 
treat as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons 
or tradeoffs with material values of realpolitik or the marketplace. Although 
the field of judgment and decision-making has made enormous progress, 
especially through the Nobel Prize winning work of Danny Kahneman (and 
the late Amos Tversky), much more is known about economic decision 
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making than about morally-motivated behavior. There is relatively little 
knowledge, study or theoretical discussion of sacred values, which differ from 
material or instrumental values by incorporating moral (including religious) 
beliefs that may drive action independently of its prospect of success. 
 
From extensive personal interviews and controlled psychological experiments 
with Israeli settlers, Palestinian refugees, leaders of Hamas, radical Islamic 
groups in Pakistan and Indonesia, and (ongoing pilot work) with certain non-
Muslim fundamentalist groups, I (together with a research team including 
Jeremy Ginges, Douglas Medin, and Khalil Shikaki) find that when disputed 
issues are transformed into sacred values, as when land ceases to be a mere 
resource and becomes "holy" or when structures of brick and mortar become 
"sacred sites," then standard political and economic proposals for resolving 
conflicts don't suffice and can be counterproductive by raising levels of 
outrage and disgust. But even token symbolic concessions, such as an 
apology for a perceived wrong that touches a sacred value, can be more 
important than material trade-offs in making peace. 
Almost all current approaches to resolving resource conflicts or countering 
political violence tend to assume that adversaries make rational choices. 
Such assumptions are prevalent in risk assessment and modeling by foreign 
aid and international development projects, and by U.S. diplomatic, military 
and intelligence services as well. Similarly, in economics, political science 
and psychology, most academic courses and journals analyze decision-
making in terms of strict cost-benefit calculations regarding goals, and entail 
abandoning or adjusting goals if costs for realizing them are too high. When 
people are asked to trade sacred values for material rewards they tend to 
react with outrage and anger, although they are sometimes able to accept 
trading one sacred value for another.  
But not all things in the world can be treated like items in a shopping mall, or 
thought of in terms of tit-for-tat. To most of us, it is morally abhorrent to sell 
one's children or sell out one's country for money (or for almost anything else 
we can imagine). And most of us would be outraged and disgusted by 
someone willing to offer such a tradeoff for our children, our country, or 
anything else we may value as "sacred."   
For example, rational cost-benefit analysis says that the Palestinians "should" 
agree to give up their claim to Jerusalem in return for an autonomous state in 
the West Bank and Gaza (they would gain more land than they would 
renounce), especially if the U.S. and Europe sweetened the deal by giving 
every Palestinian family $1,000 a year for 10 years in economic assistance. 
Instead, my research team finds that the sweetener makes Palestinians more 
opposed to the deal and even more disposed to support suicide terrorism. 
This suggests that peace between clashing moral communities cannot be 
achieved by material calculations alone.  
"Israel freeing some of our prisoners will help us to stop others from attacking 
it," the Hamas government spokesman, Ghazi Hamad, told me. "But Israel 
must apologize for our tragedy in 1948 before we can talk about negotiating 
over our right of return to historic Palestine." From the other side, Isaac Ben 
Israel, one of Israel's top military strategists, who currently heads his 
country's space program, drove home the point to me that "when we feel 
Hamas has recognized our right to exist as a Jewish state, then we can deal." 
Material tradeoffs, like prisoner exchanges, are important. However, so are 
symbolic actions, perhaps even more so. In my discussions with Palestinian 
Prime Minister Ismail Haniya and other Hamas officials, they have stressed 
the importance of Israel's recognizing their suffering from the original loss of 
Palestinian land. And our survey research of Israeli settlers, Palestinian 
refugees and Hamas reliably finds that violent opposition to peace decreases 
if the adversary is seen to compromise its own moral position, even if that 
compromise has no material value, for example by simply recognizing 
another's right to exist as a moral entity or by apologizing. In rational-choice 
models of decision making, that something as intangible as an apology 
should stand in the way of peace doesn't compute." 
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